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Experts, Liars, and Guns for Hire:
A Different Perspective on the
Qualification of Technical Expert Witnesses
CHRISTOPHER P MURPHY*
Gentlemen of the jury, there are three kinds of liars,-the
common liar, the d-d liar, and the scientific expert.'
INTRODUCTION
Expert witnesses have long been a disparaged lot. While most experts
probably are not blatant liars, they are arguably conduits of hearsay2 and
other unreliable evidence. Furthermore, they may be willing to conform their
opinions to suit the needs of the highest bidder.3 Many commentators have
suggested approaches to solve these problems and to bolster the reliability of
expert testimony Yet much of the discussion focuses on the substance of
expert evidence. This Note takes a step back and questions the expert
qualification process.
Two preliminary considerations are in order. First, this Note rests on the
simple assumption that increased diligence during the qualification of experts
will ultimately increase the reliability of opinion testimony. Of course, many
times, experienced judges deftly resolve thp qualification issue. The
qualification issue, however, may be more difficult to resolve when a judge
is faced with testimony cast in the unfamiliar language of science and
technology Second, given the increasing role technology plays in evidentiary
matters, this Note addresses the narrow issue of technological expert
qualification.
* J.D. Candidate, 1994, Indiana Universtity School of Law-Bloomington; M.S.M.E., 1990,
University of Maryland; B.E.M.E., 1983, Stevens Institute of Technology. I would like to thank Aviva
Orenstem, Associate Professor of Law at Indiana Umversity, for her help and guidance. Special thanks
go to Tammy Murphy for her loving support.
1. William L. Foster, Expert Testimony-Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 11 HARV.
L. REV. 169, 169 (1897) (quoting a trial lawyer's closing remarks after sensing defeat because of expert
testimony).
2. See, e.g., Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in Opinion
Testimony, 76 MiNN. L. REV. 859 (1992) [hereinafter Carlson, Hearsay Conduits]; cf. David L. Faigman,
Commentary: A Response to Professor Carlson. Struggling to Stop the Flood of Unreliable Expert
Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 877 (1992) (noting that policing underlying data is mconsistent with the
liberal standard for opinion testimony).
3. See Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577,
587 (1986) [hereinafter, Carlson, Modern Expert Testimony]. One commentator writes that "a Ph.D. can
be found to swear to almost any 'expert' proposition, no matter how false or foolish." Id. (quoting Peter
Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 277, 333 (1985)).
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Technology interposes our lives with benefits while requiring us to deal
with its concomitant burdens. Freon-based air conditioning, for example, cools
sweltering days while also depleting the ozone layer. Likewise, nuclear fission
provides both an abundance of energy and a potential for catastrophe.
Technology similarly impacts our judicial system. The debate over novel
scientific evidence attests to this proposition.4 Unfortunately, science does not
pause for legal solutions to the problems it poses. With increasing frequency,
judges are asked to handle technological issues.5 It is questionable, however,
whether judges and juries are equipped to do so. 6
Frequently, our legal system relies on expert witnesses to enlighten and
elucidate the fact-finder as to otherwise arcane topics. This reliance on expert
testimony causes several problems.7 First, reliability problems follow from
the need to use experts: Experts can be the source of questionable evidence;'
they are free to reach conclusions based on extra-record evidence;9 and they
can deter a meaningful evaluation of non-opinion evidence when the trier of
fact overvalues expert testimony 10 Second, the bar and bench often do not
select and qualify experts so as to minimize the negative effects of expert
4. The Supreme Court recently addressed the subject of scientific evidence. The Court held that
the common law general acceptance test for the admissibility of scientific evidence was superseded by
the enactment of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Daubert v. Meriell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
5. See David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 817, 817 (1977) (indicating that technology has precipitated evidentiary problems for judges).
Jurisdictions faced with DNA identihication evidence have approached the admissibility of such proof
differently. Compare Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d 391 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1989) (noting that DNA
identification evidence is expressly declared admissible in criminal proceedings by statute), cert. dented,
565 A.2d 670 (Md. 1989) with State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989) (holding that
noncompliance with industry standards bars admission of conclusions based upon DNA identification).
Additionally, computer animation or reenactments may be the source of technology-induced reliability
questions that judges must also answer. "[C]omputer simulations are simplified models of reality that
include only some of the variables that shaped an event. A simulation is only as good as its underlying
assumptions." Robert Garcia, "Garbage in, Gospel out"" Criminal Discovery, Computer Reliability, and
the Constitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043, 1080 (1991).
6. Bazelon, supra note 5, at 822; see also John W. Wesley, Note, Scientific Evidence and the
Question of Judicial Capacity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675 (1984).
7. See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE (1991); MICHAEL SAKS & ROBERT VAN
DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCiENTiFIC EVIDENCE IN LITGATION (1983); Edward R. Becker & Aviva
Orenstem, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning"
Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for
Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 (1992); Carlson, Hearsay Conduits, supra
note 2; Carlson, Modern Expert Testimony, supra note 3; Michael J. Wagner, Expert Problems, LiTIG.
35 (1989).
8. Huber notes that:
[S]tandards for expert witnesses have all but disappeared. Today, virtually any doctor armed
with a medical degree is qualified to testify. Sometimes he will be expected to assert that his
opinion has a "reasonable basis," that it does not originate in chicken entrails or phases of the
moon, but this is not much of a standard. [H]e may insist that he alone among doctors
understands the importance or origins of certain symptoms. He may claim, in short, to be a
new Galileo The standards are almost equally loose for other, nonmedical experts.
HUBER, supra note 7, at 16; see also infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how
an expert can be the source of hearsay evidence, see infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
9. "If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." FED. R. EViD. 703.
10. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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testimony If an expert is able to assist the trier of fact in understanding
technological evidence," the question still remains whether that expert
should be an engineer 12 or a technically-skilled witness. 3
This Note argues-in the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence-that
practitioners and judges need to make ia distinction between engineers and
other technically-skilled witnesses, that harm to litigants follows from failing
to do so, and that a process by which such distinction could be discerned can
alleviate that harm. When the distinction is made, some of the problems
associated with expert testimony are alleviated.
Part One of this Note investigates the extent of the qualification problem.
It exposes possible mistakes in the qualification of technical experts through
a critical examination of trial and appellate opinions from federal courts and
those state courts that utilize a Federal Rules counterpart. Part One demon-
strates that errors are consistently the result of a misunderstanding of the roles
of the various technical experts. After analyzing the problem, Part Two
suggests an approach for assessing the qualifications of a technical expert and,
more importantly, the appropriate scope of the expert's testimony Part Three
examines the qualification problem from the perspective of the common law
Part Four reveals the harm to litigants from failing to recognize the distinction
between engineering and technically-skilled experts. Finally, Part Five
concludes that resolution of the problem will follow from awareness by
practitioners and not from appellate guidance. The Note also suggests new
language for inclusion in the Rule's Advisory Notes to increase practioners'
awareness.
I. THE QUALIFICATION PROBLEM
Rule 702 states: "[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise."' 4 Further, the Advisory Committee's Note for Rule
11. The Federal Rules of Evidence require that expert testimony "assist the trier of fact" to be
admissible. FED. R. EVID. 702.
The term "technological" is used to distinguish such evidence from the more general body of
"technicar' evidence. The term technical is used synonymously with technological in this Note.
Technological evidence would include technology to which everyone has become accustomed (for
example, automobiles, X-rays, fingerprints, computers), as well as "cutting edge" technology.
12. For the purposes of tis Note, the term "engineer" is used broadly; for example, it would
include applied scientists. However, there is an understanding that traditional academic training was
completed by anyone designated as an engineer. Further, it is recognized that other professionals could
qualify as experts on technological issues, but this Note focuses on engineering-arguably, the harbinger
of technology.
13. A technically-skilled witness would include all competent technical witnesses other than
engineers, including, for example, auto mechamesand technicians.
Much of the literature uses the terms "technology" and "science" synonymously. In fact, they are
different. This Note confronts a legal problem precipitated by technology. It is understandably easy to
mix the concepts; however, science and technology may pose different problems requiring different
solutions. The Supreme Court recently noted this distinction. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 n.8 (1993).
14. FED. R. EVID. 702.
1994]
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702 asserts that litigants may draw expert witnesses from more than
"scientific" or "technical" fields, and includes "skilled" witnesses-for
example, bankers and auto mechanics.' 5 In making such a distinction, the
Advisory Committee suggests, albeit vaguely, that judges could qualify
different types of expert witnesses. The distinction between types of witnesses
providing technical evidence lies in the basis of the expert knowledge and its
application. An engineer gains expertise through participation in a traditional
academic process with an emphasis on mathematics and science; a skilled
witness-an auto mechanic, for example-gains knowledge through experience
and less formal training. 6
At first blush, the need to distinguish between engineers and other
technically-skilled witnesses may seem trifling. One could argue that the line-
drawing task is futile. John Wigmore argued that "the line, if any can be
drawn, between these [types of technical qualifications] has no general legal
significance. In truth no accurate line can be drawn. Each shades into the
other imperceptibly "'17 However, Wigmore also noted that "[o]n many points
the nature of the subject is such that a scientific training is indispens-
able "118 The conclusion that scientific training can be indispensable
begs the question: When is the technology sufficiently complex that testimony
on such an issue must come from an engineer9 Moreover, could seemingly
technical issues create a false impression that only an engineer is competent
to testify when, in fact, a technically-skilled witness would be equally
competent?
Increasing complexity in technology will only exacerbate the situation.
Likewise, a presumption favoring engineers-fortified by an aura of "high
technology"-might persuade ajudge to qualify an engineer who may actually
be incompetent to testify The converse is equally true; judges may disqualify
engineers because of a lack of "practical" experience in areas of technology
so common as to seem mundane.
A few examples will help define the distinction between engineering
testimony and other technical testimony and present possible errors resulting
from inappropriate qualification. In the state of Washington, a judge qualified
an auto mechanic as a competent expert on the direction of forces cars
experience in collisions. The expert based his opinion on an examination of
accident photographs of the litigants' cars. The judge felt that the witness'
15. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
16. Of course, engineers can gain practical experience and skilled witnesses can participate m
academic exercises. Clearly, the distinction is not absolute, but by definition an automobile mechanic
is not a mechanical engineering apprentice. The distinction between engineenng and technically-skilled
witnesses is defined through examination of the process by which the expert reaches a conclusion. See
infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
17. 3 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 556 (Chadbourn rev. 1979); cf. JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEiNSTEiN'S EVIDENCE 702[04] (1982) (suggesting that a judge look for
qualifications required by the case and that a judge ask whether "an expert who is qualified by
practical experience rather than education may testify") (citation omitted).
18. WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 556.
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thirty years of repair experience qualified him to make such a determina-
tion.' 9 The judge likely reasoned that mangled auto bodies reveal the
direction of forces imparted on the colliding vehicles and that the witness had
seen numerous damaged vehicles in a thirty-year career. Therefore, the
experience of the auto mechanic justified his qualification as an expert.
Such logic, however, is dubious. First, it is questionable that the dynamic
process of collapsing metal in an auto accident can be described by a single,
static snapshot. Second, assuming that resultant damage reveals the directions
of forces imparted, there is no link between the expert's repair experience and
the conclusion made during the trial. The proponent of the mechanic's
testimony should have proffered evidence sufficient to demonstrate how the
mechanic could conclude that particular vehicle damage indicates a specific
direction of impact. To the extent that the conclusion was just a gross
approximation, the auto mechanic's testimony was no more authoritative than
that which any lay juror could have made. Automotive repair training does not
provide the basis for such a conclusion.20
In a federal district court case, the plaintiff wanted to qualify a skilled
expert witness in a personal injury case.21 A tractor-trailer owned and
operated by the defendant skidded and lost control on ice; the accident injured
the plaintiff. The plaintiffs expert was a United Parcel Service truck driver
who had received in-house training about driving trucks on ice. The judge
refused to qualify the witness as an expert. The judge reasoned that the
witness was not an engineer and could not calculate the coefficient of
friction.22 One need not be an engineer, however, or know how to calculate
the coefficient of friction to know how to drive a truck on ice.23 Further-
more, an engineer in this case would probably be easier to discredit.24 Again,
the judge's confusion likely stemmed from a distorted perception of
engineering and the ambiguous construction of Rule 702.
These problems derive both from an ambiguous drafting of Rule 702 and
from a misunderstanding by judges of what constitutes an engineer.21 "[Rule
702] arguably mixes apples and oranges. On the one hand, experience,
training and education seem methods of gaining the expert's unique ability to
draw inferences. On the other hand, knowledge and skill are the end products
of experience, training and education. 26 Moreover, the rule fails to express
that the basis of qualification confines the scope of expert testimony For
example, expert testimony based upon education will not necessarily support
19. McBroom v. Omer, 395 P.2d 95, 96 (Wash. 1964).
20. See infra note 53 for a further discussion of this case.
21. Hughes v. Hemingway Trans. Inc., 539 F. Supp. 130, 133 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
22. Id.
23. See infra note 51 for further discussion of this case.
24. An engineer has no more training in driving than a lay witness. While an engineer could
conceivably calculate (after considerable time and expense) appropriate steering maneuvers to various
wheel inputs, such a daunting task seems better handled by a skilled technical expert.
25. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 526 (3d ed. 1991).
26. Id.
1994]
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inferences that correctly derive from experience. When the roles of experts are
not clear-as is the case with technological experts-the potential for
inappropriate qualification of witnesses is significant.
The distinction between witness types needs to operate in the realm between
extremely complex technical evidence, where only an engineer could qualify
as an expert, and less complex evidence, where a technically-skilled expert
might readily qualify In this gray area it becomes important not to confuse
the roles of the different experts and thereby deny a party the opportunity to
present expert testimony because of a misguided disqualification, or prejudice
an opposing party by allowing an incompetent witness to testify The
qualification problem results from both inappropriately narrow and mappropn-
ately broad views of the expert's role."
In the examples presented, justification for the qualification of the experts
is obviously questionable. Cases, typically, do not illuminate the problem so
brightly Still, qualification problems readily can be found in both the federal
courts28 and in the state courts that adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence.29
27. Consider, for example, McBroom v. Omer, 395 P.2d 95 (Wash. 1964), holding that an auto
mechanic was qualified to testify as to the direction of forces in colliding vehicles, which demonstrates
an unjustifiably broad view of the expert's role. The tractor-trailer case, Hughes v. Hemingway Trans.,
Inc., 539 F Supp. 130, 133 (E.D. Pa. 1982), demonstrates both a narrow and broad view. The UPS
driver's role as an expert was unduly limited, while the judge's perception of engineers was not
supportable.
28. An engineer testifying about engineering science should usually be given broad discretion
without regard to actual experience (of course, experience with the application of engineering science
would go to the weight of the expert evidence). See Exum v. General Elec. Co., 819 F.2d 1158 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (reversing a district court's "pinched" view of Rule 702 that required an engineer to have
particular experience). If the engineering testimony is truly engineering science, then the engineer's title
is of limited concern. Head v. Lithoma Corp., 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989) (allowing an electrical
engineer to testify as to the safety of mechanical fasteners). The qualifications of a non-engineer
testifying about engineering science, however, should be rigorously challenged. Cf. Eastburn v. Ford
Motor Co., 471 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1972) (sustaining the qualification of a witness with an MBA as an
expert in machine design). Conversely, an engineer should not be given latitude to testify outside the
scope of engineering science without sufficient particular experience. See Johnson v. Inland Steel Co.,
140 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Il1. 1992) (qualifying an engineer to testify as to the likelihood of tripping in a
stairwell).
The Eastburn and Johnson cases are examples of misguided qualification. Absent significant
experience by a non-engineer, a judge generally should not qualify a non-engineer to testify about
engineenng science (machine design in the Eastburn case). Similarly. a judge should not qualify an
engineer to testify in areas that require qualifications not obtainable by academic training, unless such
an engineer can demonstrate particularized experience (safety in the Johnson case).
29. For example, one court allowed an engineer to express opinions without engaging in engineering
analysis or having particular experience. York v. National Continental Ins. Co., 463 N.W.2d 364 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1990) (sustaining qualification of an industrial engineer as an expert in load shifting during
tractor-trailer transport). Another court considered consultation with engineers as a relevant qualification.
Fink v. Lafayette Elec. Coop., No. 88-1648, 1990 LEXIS 45 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1990) (sustaining
qualification of the party-plaintiff as an expert). To the extent that the court believed that engineering
science was the subject of the opinion testimony, it should have only qualified an engineer as an expert.
As seen supra note 28, many areas of expert testimony appear to be engineering science. Often, for
example, engineers are attributed with knowledge of safety. An engineer should not be qualified to
testify on matters of safety without particular experience. See, e.g., Maci v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 314 N.W.2d 914 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing an engineering expert to testify as to what
constituted a safe walking surface). Similarly, courts sometimes presumptively forbid experts to qualify
[Vol. 69:637
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Often, judges confused by roles inappropriately qualify technological experts.
Therefore, practitioners and judges must understand the difference between
engineering and other technical professions."
The skilled professional can solve problems within a realm narrowly defined
by her experience. The engineer can solve a breadth of technical problems
limited, theoretically, only by her creativity However, the reach of science
limits the depth of application by an engineer. Thus, an engineer providing
insight into the operation of a device generally reaches an opinion based upon
experience rather than by application of scientific theories.3 Consequently,
a judge must take care to distinguish the engineer's role as a theorist and as
an experiential technician.
In summary, the engineer can provide information broadly in a qualitative
sense. Arguably arbitrary designations of engineering types (for example,
mechanical, electrical, or civil) should not be generally dispositive of the
qualification issue,32 nor should a lack of particular experience be deci-
sive.33 Any challenge in this regard would go to the weight of evidence. An
engineer's practical understanding with particular technologies, however, will
depend on either his experience with the technology or the compatibility of
theory to answer such questions. The skilled technical witness will have an
understanding of the practicalities of technology 31 Of course, either witness
type may cross over these definitional boundaries. Yet, judges and practitio-
ners must take care to understand the distinction or recognize the consequenc-
es of qualifying an incompetent witness.
in areas of engineering science without realizing the qualitative contribution their experience might
provide. Oldakowski v. Heyen, No. 87-0988, 1988 LEXIS 572 (Wis. Ct. App. May 19, 1988)
(disallowing a medical doctor to testify to the protective qualities of a motorcycle helmet).
30. Engineering is the study of scientific pinnciples-mathematics, physics, and engineering
science-and their application to solve practical problems. Skilled technical professionals also solve
practical problems. A first possible source of confusion of roles emanates from the common ground
shared. However, though the application of skills is practical, the engineer's training is theoretical. In
contrast, the skilled technical professional's traimng is practical.
Consider an example: both the engineer and technician are tasked with designing an automobile
engine. The engineer will use principles of thermodynamics (the study of energy transport), heat transfer
(the study of heat flow and temperature distribution), and machine design (the study of forces, stresses,
and strains in machine members) to complete the design task. The technician will use her experience
with automobile engines to complete the task. She will know from experience, for example, that
increasing the piston diameter will increase power and operating temperature in a qualitative sense. An
engineer can calculate those properties quantitatively.
31. For example, an engineer who can tune an engine can do so because of experience, not because
she theorizes the proper approach.
32. The sciences applied in all branches of engineering are the same, only the applications differ.
For example, it is a technique for mechanical engineers to convert mechanical components to their
electrical analog for analysis.
33. See supra note 28.
34. It may be beneficial in some cases to view an engineer testifyng on technical practicalities as
in fact being a skilled technical witness who happens also to be an engineer.
19941
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II. SUGGESTED APPROACH TO QUALIFYING THE TECHNICAL EXPERT
The qualification of technological experts should proceed in three steps.
First, recognition of the two different witness types is essential for appropriate
qualification of the technological expert. Once the witness type has been
identified, a useful qualification analysis can proceed. Next, the witness'
background, education, experience, and curriculum vitae must be evaluated.35
Finally, the proponent of the expert testimony must establish a "fit" or
congruence between the expert's qualifications and testimony 16 Often, the
congruence between qualifications and testimony will be obvious. For
example, the fit between the qualifications of a neurologist and testimony
about head injuries is clear. Yet, could a neurologist testify about the
protective qualities of a motorcycle helmet?" The congruence issue becomes
important when the technological expert could be either an engineer or
another. technically-skilled witness.
Witnesses can be classified into two types based on the analytical process
by which the expert reaches an opinion. The analytical process is either
inductive or deductive. The inductive witness" will base her opinions upon
her experience and other empirical data. From the collection of experiences,
the inductive witness reaches various conclusions. Those conclusions form the
35. This step is traditionally deemed "qualifying an expert." However, under the proposed approach,
the basis of qualification-knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education-will be influenced by
the witness type.
36. The "fit" step is taken by analogy from United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.
1985). In Downing, the court held that under certain circumstances an expert could testify on the
reliability of eyewitness testimony. Id. at 1231-32. The court required that the factual conditions of the
case must be sufficiently similar to the expert's theoretical parameters so that relevancy could be
established. Id. at 1242. For example, if the eyewitness identification theory suggests that differences
in race between the eyewitness and defendant impair the accuracy of the identification, then the
proponent of the expert testimony must proffer such a racial difference. Id. Similarly, there must be
congruence between the basis of the expert's qualification and the testimony to be given.
37. "[A neurologist] is not an expert as to the protective qualities of a motorcycle helmet. [The
neurologist] has no expertise or special knowledge of motorcycle helmets or their capacity to withstand
impact or prevent skull injury." Oldakowskl v. Heyen, No. 87-0988, 1988 LEXIS 572, at *6 (Wis. Ct.
App. May 19, 1988).
Yet, a neurologist may arguably be qualified to testify about the protective qualities of motorcycle
helmets. Such an argument depends upon distinguishing between witness types. If the neurologist had
witnessed-on sufficient occasions-the harm to motorcycle riders from failing to wear helmets, then
the doctor might provide a qualitative opinion as to the protective qualities of helmets. However, since
there would not be a fit between the neurologist's experiential basis of qualification and any. opinion
about forces on impact, the doctor could not offer a quantitative opinion. See infra note 52 and
accompanying text.
38. The inductive witness might well be called an empirical witness or experiential witness.
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rules and theories by which the expert reaches an opinion.39 Technically-
skilled witnesses are inductive witnesses.
By comparison, engineers typically are deductive witnesses. An engineer
uses general theories of mathematics and science to reach case-specific
opinions. Those theories used to reach an opinion do not depend upon the
validity of the underlying empirical data.40 In other words, the mathematical
and scientific theories that form the basis of an engineering opinion are
analytically formed. An engineer generally does not hypothesize a theory and
then modify it to fit data collected in nature.41 The previous discussion,
however, only applies to an engineer acting as a deductive witness; an
engineer in other circumstances might act as an inductive witness.42
After identifying the witness type, the task of reviewing relevant qualifica-
tions becomes easier. Education and demonstrated proficiency in analysis
become the paramount concern regarding deductive witnesses, while
experience is the primary concern regarding inductive witnesses. An engineer
is trained in general principles; no particular application of mathematical or
scientific theories is emphasized.43 As such, engineers testifying as deductive
witnesses would be competent experts in numerous situations, limited only by
their ability to apply engineering principles. Judges and attorneys, however,
39. Many times the technological, inductive witness will personally form the theones upon which
conclusions are reached. For example, the auto mecham could form a theory that carbon deposits on
spark plugs indicate a sticking choke after many observations of the problem. However, the inductive
witness need not have made the observations personally. A psychologist uses empirically-based theories
even though he may not have personally observed the underlying data. The status of the expert as an
inductive witness does not change because the theories are learned through formal training. While the
auto mechanic might learn of the cause of sticking chokes in a classroom, the theory is still formed
inductively.
40. While the mathematical and scientific theories do not depend upon the validity of the underlying
data, the case-specific data used in any calculation does present validity and reliability concerns.
41. For example, in developing differential calculus, Isaac Newton was able to establish that a force
imparted to a body is equal to the body's mass times the rate of the body's acceleration.
42. For example, safety engineers likely will base opinions on empirical theories; the design of a
protective guard follows from observation of the effectiveness of other guards. Thus, an engineer
qualified as a safety expert should have particular experience with the safety concerns at issue. Not all
engineers possess such expertise. In contrast, virtually any engineer could calculate, for example, the
force a guard could withstand before failing.
43. Engineering education is traditionally divided along mechanical, electrical, chemical, or civil
engineering lines. The underlying mathematical and scientific theories, however, are identical. In fact,
mechanical systems have electrical analogs. The qualification issue is not whether there exists
congruence between the engineer's title and the subject of the opinion rendered, but rather whether the
engineer has sufficient proficiency in a particular application of his skills. See Martin v. Fleissner
GMBH, 741 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that a lack of direct experience with crimpers was an
insufficient basis to reject the engineering expert's opinion because the testimony related to engineering
design); Dychalo v. Cooperloy Corp., 78 F.R.D. 146, 149 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (allowing a metallurgical
engineer "to express an opinion that sounded in 'mechanical' engineering" because such an opinion used
"basic principles common to all engineering study") (citation omitted); cf. Nichols Constr. Corp. v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 808 F.2d 340, 354 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding harmless error in the district court's
ruling that allowed an aeronautical engineer to testify about aircraft pressurization while also cautioning
the jury that such testimony was "outside his 'specific area of responsibility"') (citation omitted).
19941
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL[V
should only attribute this latitude to an engineer testifying as a deductive
witness. 44
The qualifications of an engineer acting as a deductive witness are easily
measured by objective standards. Of principal concern is the educational
background of the engineer including whether the engineer holds any
advanced degrees. Publication of research papers in refereed journals provides
an indication of proficiency 4' Additionally, the engineer's proficiency using
techniques needed to reach an opinion on a litigated issue can be measured
by comparing the similarity of the techniques utilized during litigation with
those techniques used by the engineer in his practice outside of litigation.
When an engineer or other technically-skilled witness acts as an inductive
witness, experience 46 is the primary qualification issue. It is important not
to attribute competency to an engineer testifying about matters outside of
engineering science solely because of educational background.47
Finally, there must be a fit between the expert's qualifications and the
proposed testimony If an engineer is acting as a deductive witness or
testifying about engineering science, then the fit inherently follows and no
further inquiry is required.4" Yet, when an engineer or other technically-
skilled witness acts as an inductive witness, the congruence issue becomes
important.49 The proponent of admission of the inductive witness' testimony
must proffer foundational evidence that establishes the relevancy of the
underlying empirical data forming the basis of opinion. 0 Relevancy is
established by demonstrating sufficient similarity between the facts of a case
and the data that form the inductive theory Any dissimilarities between the
facts and empirical data must be insignificant. Factors to be considered in
44. Failure to recognize this distinction can result m harm to the opposing party. See infra notes
74-82 and accompanying text.
45. These objective standards are particularly indicative of competency because the technical
community, not thejudiciary, makes the assessment ofproficiency. Thus, such standards encompass one
of the benefits of the Frye test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence. However, unlike the Frye
standard, the qualification analysis will not necessarily limit the evidentiary benefits that advancing
science has to offer.
46. Education is also an issue for qualification, especially for professional, inductive witnesses. See
supra note 43. However, experience is likely the primary qualification criterion for the non-professional
inductive witness testifying about technology.
47. An engineer testifying as an inductive witness must have the requisite experience to qualify. See
School Dist. No. 11 v. Sverdrup & Parcel, 797 F.2d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1986) (allowing a civil engineer
to testify regarding the performance of an architect because of twenty years experience consulting
architects); cf. Hughes v. Hemmingway Transport Inc., 539 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that
a court may disallow testimony of an expert witness if it finds requisite experience lacking).
48. A deductive witness testifies about the results of an analytical process. Her theories do not
follow from empirical data; therefore, the theories are "valid" notwithstanding the underlying data. (Of
course, her conclusion based upon the theories could be in error.) Thus the fit inherently follows.
49. Many times engineers will testify about ostensible engineering science. See Maci v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 314 N.W.2d 914 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing an engineer to testify as an expert
as to what constituted a safe walking surface); Johnson v. Inland Steel Co., 140 F.LD. 367 (N.D. Il.
1992) (allowing an engineer to testify as an expert as to the likelihood of tripping in a stairwell). In
these cases, the engineers were actually testifying as inductive witnesses; their experience with safe
walking surfaces and stairwells should have been the primary qualification.
50. Cf United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985). See supra note 36 for an
explanation of the fit requirement in Downing.
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deciding whether a fit exists are: 1) whether as a logical matter there exists
sufficient similarity between the underlying empirical data that forms the
theory and the facts of the litigated issue,5 2) whether there are sufficient
data points to justify a theory,52 and 3) whether as a logical matter the
underlying empirical data or appropriate training in theories can support the
conclusions to be made.53 The judge can disqualify an inductive witness
under Rule 104(a) if the correlation between the empirical data and induced
theory is weak 4 or under Rule 403 if the testimony is a waste of time.
55
III. PERSPECTIVES FROM THE COMMON LAW
To better understand the rules-based analysis of the qualification issue, it
may be useful to examine the common law approach to qualifying engineering
and other technically-skilled experts. The practice and profession of
engineering as it is known today was born in this country contemporaneously
with the Industrial Revolution.-6 During this period, while expert witness
testimony was generally an established litigator's tool, the engineering expert
faced uncertain prospects. In some cases, judges disallowed engineering
testimony about subjects that one with modern hindsight would clearly deem
51. In the Hughes case, the witness was not qualified as an expert in tractor-trailer skid
control-because he lacked engineering trammg--despite being trained in skid-control by his employer.
Hughes v. Hemingway Trans., 539 F. Supp. 130, 133 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The witness' lack of engineerng
training is irrelevant concerning the qualification of an inductive witness. The proper focus should have
been placed on the fit between the witness' driving experience and the driving conditions that existed
in the case. If the witness had driven similar trucks under similar icy and skidding conditions, then he
arguably could have been qualified as an inductive witness.
52. In Wisconsin, a neurologist cannot qualify as an expert on the protective qualities of motorcycle
helmets or hard hats. Oldakowski v. Heyen, 428 N.W.2d 644, 647 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) ("[A
neurologist] has no expertise or special knowledge of motorcycle helmets or their capacity to withstand
impact or prevent skull injury."). To the extent that this decision held that a neurologist cannot qualify
as a deductive expert-one capable of calculating the energy attenuation properties of helmets-the
holding is consistent with this Note. Yet, given sufficient experience by a neurologist who has observed
the effects of both wearing and not wearing protective head gear, the neurologist could qualify as an
inductive witness. The issue becomes whether the neurologist has observed sufficient data points to form
a qualitative theory of helmet protection. Arguably, such information should meet the "assist-the-tner-of-
fact" test.
53. In Washington, a witness qualified, based on 30 years experience repairing automobiles, as an
expert on the direction of forces exerted by vehicles in a collision. The expert testified about the
direction of forces in colliding vehicles after observing the damage to the vehicles. McBroom v. Omer,
395 P.2d 95, 96 (Wash. 1964). To qualify as an inductive witness, there must be some correlation
between the data observed and conclusions made. The expert in McBroom would need to
know-through the course of his thirty years experience-for each vehicle repaired, the direction of
forces exerted (perhaps his customers could have told hun the directions they were pushed during
collisions) in conjunction with the resultant damage to the vehicle. Only when there is such a complete
set of data could the auto mechanic have been qualified as an inductive witness. If a data point
necessary to induce a theory is missing from the underlying empirical data, then the "expert" using such
data is making a conclusion that any lay juror could make and does not assist the trier of fact.
54. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, 702[04], at 702-45.
55. 56 F.R.D. 183, 218 advisory committee's note.
56. See CARROLL W. PURSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF INDIVIDUALS AND IDEAS
69-70 (1981); TERRY S. REYNOLDS, THE ENGINEER IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL ANTHOLOGY FROM
TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 7-26 (1991).
1994]
INDL4NA LAWJOURNAL
an appropriate engineering subject.57 Other courts recognized the import of
an engineering education."5 Perhaps the disparate views can be attributed to
the youthful position engineering academia maintained relative to scientific
study-an area traditionally accorded the need for expert testimony "
Interestingly, engineers during this period were trained either through an
academic process similar to its modern counterpart or were trained through
apprenticeship and on-the-job training-akin to the skilled technical
witness.60
Nineteenth century common law required that expert testimony be given
only on matters in which lay jurors could not form a conclusion from
assessing the facts. Namely, only conclusions that could not be verified by the
trier of fact were allowed." Two factors operated to prevent engineers from
giving testimony First, the expert must have had "special practical acquain-
tance" with the proposed, line of inquiry 62 Such an approach barred
testimony from engineers without practical experience comparable to the
issues in dispute.63 Second, general knowledge of an issue in dispute was
sufficient. "[The expert] need not be exhaustively acquainted with the
differentia of the specific specialty under consideration."' Many times-in
areas that are today considered engineering-early judges accepted testimony
from non-engineers 61 or deemed expert testimony inappropriate because it
57. In Clark v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 32 Mich. 348 (1875), the court held that an engineer
was not competent to opine on the cause ofbeanng heating and binding because the cause of the defects
presented sub judice was outside the scope of opinion evidence. "It is not a question of science or
mechamcs, and is not peculiar to shipping. Precisely similar questions might arise in the use of any
implement or machinery on land or water." Id. at 350. On other occasions, engineers were deemed
incompetent because they did not have particularized experience. See Benedict v. Fond du Lac, 44 Wis.
495, 496-97 (1878) (noting the trial court reliance on a civil engineer's lack of actual experience in
highway construction).
58. An engineering education was sufficient to allow a witness to qualify as an expert; practical
experience was not required. Central R.R. v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 173 (1879); cf Indianapolis v. Scott, 72
Ind. 196, 203 (Ind. 1880) (finding a civil engineer competent to opine on the soundness of timbers in
bridges, but also noting that the witness "had handled woods since he was a boy") (citation omitted).
59. "The non-expert gives the results of a process ofreasoning familiar to every-day life; the expert
gives the results of a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by special scientists." FRANCIS
WHARTON, I COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL IssuEs 394 (3d ed. 1988).
60. See REYNOLDS, supra note 56, at 13-23. However, even the engineering institutions disagreed
on the proper approach to engineering education, diverging along the theoretical-practical line. Schools
such as Stevens Institute of Technology, Sibley College at Comell, and Massachusetts Institute of
Technology emphasized higher mathematics, theoretical science, and original research (consistent with
the French and German tradition). Other schools, such as the Rose Polytechnic Institute, stressed
practical shop experience (consistent with the British approach). Graduates from the latter group were
able to work as shop foremen and machinists. Id. at 124.
61. Schmeder v. Barney, 113 U.S. 645 (1885); Milwaukee v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876);
WHARTON, supra note 59, at 395.
62. WHARTON, supra note 59, at 401.
63. Cf supra note 31 and accompanying text.
64. WHARTON, supra note 59, at 401.
65. See, e.g., Bemis v. Central Vermont R.R., 58 Vt. 636, 641 (1886) (finding a carpenter competent
to testify as to the "strength of such [hoisting equipment], and with the strain upon its different parts
when used to its capacity'); Brabbits v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 38 Wis. 289 (1875) (finding a
mechanic competent to testify on the effects of a leaking throttle valve); Murphy v. New York Cent.
R.R, 66 Barb. 125 (N.Y. Ch. 1867) (noting that a mechanic could testify as to the workings of a
railroad car on a curve).
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was within the realm of understanding of a lay person.66 This observation is
not to suggest that the non-engineers were not competent to testify in all the
cited cases. However, it is clear that in its infancy, engineering was not
accorded its due depth or breadth of application. Unfortunately, many of the
problems exhibited in the nineteenth century continue today
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HARM FROM INAPPROPRIATE QUALIFICATION
In a trial, harm to litigants results either from improper qualification of an
incompetent expert or failure to qualify a competent expert.67 The first
problem provides a vehicle for introduction of unreliable proof, while the
latter problem denies a litigant the opportunity to present credible evidence.
Agdin, the inductive-deductive analysis prevents improper qualification of
experts and mitigates the harm to litigants. Moreover, the inductive-deductive
dichotomy, when properly applied, alleviates some of the traditionally
recognized complaints about expert witnesses.
First, any inappropriate expectation by the trier of fact of expert testimony,
generally, and engineering evidence, specifically, can be put into proper
perspective by limiting expert testimony to areas for which the expert is
actually qualified. The inductive-deductive distinction will constrain testimony
within appropriate boundaries so that a jury will not overvalue specious
testimony Second, questionable and irrelevant expert testimony can be
eliminated to the extent that such testimony inappropriately crosses the
inductive-deductive line. Finally, given that it is more likely for a deductive
witness to use extra record evidence, a party opponent can use the distinction
between witness types to highlight the fact that the inductive witness' opinion
flows from evidence within the record.
Juries may overvalue the testimony of engineers. Overvalued expert
testimony is perhaps an unavoidable consequence of the need for experts.
Still, many courts have recognized the potential that jurors will place undue
emphasis on scientific testimony 68 Some research has substantiated these
judicial speculations.69 Judges, too, may be suspect of overvaluing scientific
66. See, e.g., Enright v. San Francisco & San Jose R.R., 33 Cal. 230, 236-37 (1867) (holding that
the sufficiency of a fence to withstand the forces imparted by domestic animals was not an issue "of
science nor of peculiar or educated skill" and should be determined by the jury).
67. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
68. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[S]lcentific proof may in some
instances assume a posture of mythic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen.") (citation omitted);
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Scientific testimony particularly
courts (a danger of undue prejudice] because of its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.')
(citation omitted); People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968) ("Mathematics, a veritable sorcerer
in our computerized society, while assisting the trier of fact in the search for truth, must not cast a spell
over him.") (citation omitted); see also Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (Md. 1978).
69. "It is well documented by numerous laboratory studies that, other things being equal, [the expert
witness] attributed to have the greater status or credentials is usually the more persuasive or influential."
Steven C. Bank & Norman G. Poythress, Jr., The Elements ofPersuasion in Expert Testimony, 10 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 173, 178 (1982). The study made comparisons between the credibility of experts, not
experts and lay witnesses. Id.
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testimony 70 Yet, in the context of the inductive-deductive dichotomy,
overvalued irrelevant testimony can be avoided. If an engineering witness
lacking sufficient experience to qualify as an inductive witness 7' cloaks
otherwise incompetent testimony in engineering-science garb, then a jury
potentially could overvalue unreliable testimony Adequate review of an
expert's credentials including the inductive-deductive distinction would
prevent admission of unfounded theories disguised as engineering science. The
converse is equally true. The inductive-deductive distinction can be used to
prevent an inductiye witness from offering engineering science testimony
Moreover, once judges and practitioners identify the witness types, the
distinction clarifies the appropriate scope of the witness' expertise. When the
true role of experts is clear, the trier-of-fact is in a better position to attach
suitable weight to the expert's opinion.
Notwithstanding the prior suggestion, a jury may have no problem
attributing an appropriate weight to expert testimony 72 But assuming that to
be true, problems still remain. First, there may be a presumption in technical
cases that the experts must have technical backgrounds. 73 Such a presump-
tion would disfavor the inductive witness and thus promote the use of
engineering testimony with its concomitant concerns-the reliance on extra-
record evidence and the potential for introduction of hearsay
In bolstering the credibility of an expert witness, attorneys will select, as
circumstances allow, witnesses with significant trial experience.74 Therefore,
if available, attorneys might select "professional" experts-whether inductive
or deductive-because of their trial experience and demonstrated track record.
Absent such a resource, attorneys must select experts from the technical
community rather than classified advertisements. As such, credibility concerns
70. In a poll of judges and lawyers, 70% of those questioned thought juries gave scientific evidence
more weight and 75% thought judges found scientific evidence more credible. SAKS & VAN DUIZEND,
supra note 7, at 5.
71. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
72. "Jurors not only trust their own perception and memory; they tend to trust the perception and
memory of other lay persons as well." Edward J. Imwinkelned, The Standard for Admitting Scientific
Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 ViLL. L. REv. 554, 570 (1982-83);
see also Neil Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony,
52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 161 (1989) (suggesting that jurors do not appear to suspend their
own judgment in deference to the expert). But see James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertise to
Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting
and Excluding Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 626 (1984) (suggesting that
jurors are more likely to defer to witnesses with expertise for which the jurors have no everyday life
equivalent).
73. See Imwinkelned, supra note 72, at 559. While largely anecdotal, Imwinkelred notes that some
prosecutors believe that jurors expect scientific evidence of guilt. Id. It is not unreasonable to infer a
similar expectation in civil cases dealing with complex technical issues. The issue is whether the
inductive witness without educational credentials would fulfill that expectation. If ajury responds more
favorably to scientific evidence, then it is not unreasonable to believe they will respond more favorably
to a scientist delivenng such testimony. Moreover, the attorneys selecting the experts may fiielthe
expectation by preferrng engineers.
74. Confidence and charisma increases credibility. Bank & Poythress, supra note 69, at 180.
Arguably, experience in a trial setting will bring additional confidence. The inductive witness with
particularized expertise will have less opportunity to act as an expert than an engineer with broader
expertise.
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may dictate that engineering experts testify. If the previous assumption-that
in technical cases juries expect scientific evidence-is valid, then delivery of
scientific evidence by a scientist rides on the jury's expectations. Consequent-
ly, trial tactics rather than reliability become the impetus for the selection of
experts. 75 By recognizing the inductive-deductive distinction, however, a
party-opponent might successfully argue for disqualification of the engineering
expert who lacks sufficient experience to form inductive theories.
Moreover, the inductive-deductive distinction sheds light on the credibility
of "professional" inductive witnesses. The inductive expert's strength as a
witness depends on her experience. A "professional" inductive witness'
experience predominately consists of courtroom testimony rather than
application of her craft. When a practitioner properly identifies an expert as
inductive, the credibility of the "professional" inductive witness can be
challenged by noting her lack of real world experience.
Also, the inductive-deductive dichotomy reveals the source of unreliable
evidence. Judges and practitioners may inappropriately use the educational
background of an engineer to support finding sufficient qualifications to act
as an inductive witness. When the underlying empirical data is incomplete or
questionable assumptions supplement the data, an educational background
cannot fill the gaps.76 Under those conditions when the connection between
the underlying empirical data and the expert's opinion is tenuous, the jury
receives unreliable testimony Judges should exclude such testimony 77
Furthermore, the engineering expert improperly qualified as an inductive
witness introduces potentially less reliable evidence from a hearsay perspec-
tive. While Rule 703 allows otherwise inadmissible evidence "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field" to form the basis of
an expert's opinion,78 engineering testimony improperly classified as
experiential testimony will possess fewer of the traditional indicia of
reliability 71 Consider a wrongful death action where the plaintiffs expert
75. Moreover, such tactics may influence selection of the less reliable witness. See infra notes 83-85
and accompanying text.
76. Lee W. Miller, Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses: Dispelling the Aura of Reliability, 42
U. MiAMI L. REV. 1073, 1083 (1988); see also Carlson, Modern Expert Testimony, supra note 3, at 588
(noting that engineering testimony was excluded because facts contrary to undisputed evidence and
unrealistic assumptions cannot be reasonably relied on by experts).
77. See United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (Ist Cir. 1979). Besides relevancy, the Fosher
court also listed failure to assist the trier of fact, confusion of the issues, waste of time, failure to base
testimony on generally accepted scientific pnnciples, and appropriate cross-examination as reasons for
excluding expert testimony. Id. at 382-84. The court did not indicate whether the reasons would operate
independently to exclude expert testimony.
"If the underlying data are so lacking in probative force and reliability that no reasonable expert could
base an opinion on them, an opinion which rests entirely upon them must be excluded." Carlson,
Modern Expert Testimony, supra note 3, at 583 (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability Litigation,
611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
78. FED. R. EviD. 703.
79. Indicators of reliability include perception, memory, narration, and sincerity. MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 245 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). Additionally, an opportunity for cross-examination
provides "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." Id.
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was an industrial engineer.8 0 The decedent dock-worker was found crushed
under bales that were transported in the defendant's tractor-trailer; there were
no witnesses to the accident."' The expert concluded that the bales had
shifted during transport and that the resulting stress caused the bales to fall
forward and crush the decedent when he attempted to unload the bales.8 2
The industrial engineering expert in that case testified as an inductive
witness; 3 he based his opinion upon discussions with witnesses to the
conditions of the accident.8 4 Such conversations, however, are in some
degree subject to all the problems of hearsay including perception, memory,
narration, and sincerity 85 A technically-skilled witness, however, with
experience in loading and transporting trailers could testify on the likelihood
of load shifting. Compared to an engineer acting as an inductive witness, the
technically-skilled witness does not rely so heavily upon the sincerity of
hearsay to conclude that a particular loading scheme is more or less likely to
shift.
The inductive witness usually forms empirical theories from many data
points collected from years of experience. Thus, the true inductive witness can
form an opinion on the ultimate issue (in the present example, whether the
loading scheme was subject to toppling) based on personal experience, not
questionable hearsay The inductive witness' experience becomes part of the
trial record and is subject to analysis by the trier-of-fact. As such, the jury
can independently assess the validity of the inductive theories. On the other
hand, the trier-of-fact cannot effectively scrutinize the opinions of an engineer
marginally acting as an inductive witness; the jury is unable to conduct a
viable, independent assessment of the engineer's theories. A failure to
recognize the proper scope of engineering testimony from a reliability
perspective can result in qualification of the less favorable witness.
Furthermore, an engineer acting as either an inductive or deductive witness
is apt to base an opinion on extra-record evidence. 6 In contrast, the
80. York v. National Continental Ins. Co., 463 N.W.2d 364 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
81. Id. at 366.
82. Id. at 367.
83. The engineer could have testified as a deductive witness, modeling the configuration of the bales
to determine if transport could have caused them to topple. However, the opinion implies that the
expert's conclusion was based only upon an examination of the physical conditions of the accident. Id.
84. The engineering expert's opinion was based upon disputed conditions. First, the defendant
argued that the decedent was improperly unloading by hand and that such manual unloading caused the
bales to shift. The expert opined that the decedent was using a forklift. That conclusion was based upon
observations by witnesses of the accident scene. Id. at 366. Second, the condition of the trailer floor
was in dispute. The expert concluded that the trailer floor was wet and that the wetness prevented the
decedent from avoiding the falling bales. Id. Again, the expert's opinion was not based upon personal
observations.
85. The perception of the on-scene witnesses may go untested. Further, the engineer's investigation
is subject to the ability of the on-scene witnesses to remember the event. Problems with narration could
occur. However, the most significant concern is the sincerity of the witnesses. Fear of personal liability
could motivate the witnesses to distort their observations. At the time of the engineer's investigation,
the witnesses are not subject to cross-examination.
86. Carlson notes that:
Courts have not always appreciated the fine but important distinction between allowing an
extra-record report to form a basis for courtroom opinion and permitting the whole of the
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technically-skilled witness acting as an inductive witness will base conclusions
on evidence contained within the record.87 The use of an inductive witness
provides the jury the opportunity to independently validate the inductive
theories because all elements of such theories are contained within the record.
The deductive witness' testimony, too, may include unreliable evidence.
Without appropriate judicial scrutiny, the engineer could introduce hearsay or
other inadmissible evidence into the record. Such hearsay can be particularly
questionable when an engineer acts as an inductive witness.8 8 Commentators
have grappled with the problems associated with the admissibility of the bases
of expert opinions.8 9 Therefore, in those jurisdictions taking a passive
approach to controlling the bases of expert testimony, it may be beneficial for
opponents of engineering experts to aggressively attack the qualifications of
engineering experts acting as inductive witnesses.
report to come into evidence. [M]ost experts will not rely exclusively on reports of others
With technical subjects, such as engineering, a highly qualified expert may develop
his opinions from pnmary records generated exclusively by other professionals. While some
of these underlying records will have been offered and received into evidence by the time the
expert testifies, others will not.
Carlson, Modern Expert Testimony, supra note 3, at 584-85.
Frequently, an engineer will rely on computer software to assist in the analysis of problems.
Generally, computer generated reports are admissible under the business records exception, FED. t
EVID. 803(6), or the public records exception, FED. t EVID. 803(8). United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d
603, 605 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 914 (Ist Cir. 1991). The computer
generated output in these cases is merely a compilation of data previously imputed. The output of
engineering software, however, results from the algorithms and assumptions of the programmer. If an
engineer uses commercial software, those algorithms and assumptions may be taken for granted or
unknown. The output of the program is arguably implied hearsay. Also, it would not be independently
admissible under the business or public records exceptions.
The admissibility of the output of computer simulations will depend upon whether the underlying
assumptions are "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." FED. R. EvID. 703; see, e.g.,
Starr v. Campos, 655 P.2d 794 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). It is questionable, however, whether the experts
relying upon the computer simulation will even know what the underlying assumptions are.
87. Because the inductive theories of the empirical witness will be based upon past experiences, the
whole of the witness' experience will probably appear in the record as summary.
Yet, inductive testimony presents its own concerns. Opponents of expert inductive testimony,
however, can challenge the link between experience and theory during voir dire or cross-examination.
Once the inductive witness is qualified, his testimony is only relevant when the predicate facts of the
case are introduced into evidence.
88. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
89. See Carlson, Hearsay Conduits, supra note 2, at 872 ("Courts should actively police the bases
of modem expert testimony. mhe solution is for the trial judge, before testimony, to assess the
trustworthiness of the material which the expert relied upon") (citation omitted); see also Carlson,
Modern Expert Testimony, supra note 3; ef. Faigman, supra note 2 (noting an inconsistency in having
a restrictive standard for admission of underlying data but a liberal standard for opinion testimony
generally); Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basts for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response
to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1987) (finding it illogical to admit the expert's opinion
as substantive evidence but not the underlying data).
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V RESOLUTION OF THE QUALIFICATION PROBLEM
Appellate courts are not likely to resolve the problems associated with the
qualification of technological experts. First, qualification of an expert is
within the broad discretion of the trial judge;9 ° appellate courts will not
disturb such discretion unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous. 9' Moreover,
appellate courts typically refrain from commenting extensively on the
qualification of experts. 92 Even when appellate courts provide guidance,
reversals for abuse of discretion are rare.93 The "bewildering thicket of
overlapping legal principles" involved in expert testimony limits significant
appellate opinion to extreme cases. 94 These conditions are not the best
impetus for change by appellate courts. Trial judges and practitioners must
recognize the subtle problem described in this Note.
Yet, one study revealed that a majority of federal and state judges
responding to a survey found few or no problems with the qualification of
experts. 9 In cases involving technical issues, sixty-five percent of the federal
judges surveyed and fifty-seven percent of the state judges surveyed opposed
special rules for the qualification of expert witnesses.96 If those statistics
suggest that trial judges are unaware of or do not know that the technological-
expert qualification problem exists, then there is a greater burden on
practitioners to be conscious of the problem and raise it when it occurs.
Redrafting Rule 702 or including clarification and guidance in the Advisory
Note to the Rule would address the qualification problem. The Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States ("Standing Committee") submitted for public comment a
modified version of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee's ("Advisory
90. See, e.g., Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962); Fernandez v. Chios
Shipping Co., 542 F.2d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 1976).
91. Fernandez, 542 F.2d at 153.
92. Doyle, supra note 72, at 629.
93. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 79, § 13.
94. Not all commentators, however, would agree that procedural complexities limit appellate
opinion. Cf Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be
Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 641 (1991) ("It should be pointed out that in the thousands of cases
before me in the past twenty-five years, in only three that I can recall was exclusion of an expert's
testimony warranted. [P]erhaps this is partly due to our skilled federal bar and to the fact that
federal judges strongly discourage the digression from our task of searching for the truth to play
courtroom games.").
95. Judges' Optnions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Tnal Judges Who Spend
at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 738 (1989) (indicating that 31%
of federal judges and 35% of state judges had few problems with the qualification of experts; 25% of
federal judges and 23% of state judges had no problems).
96. Id. at 741.
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Committee") proposed revisions to Rule 702. 9' The clarification and
guidance provided in the Advisory Note is, however, the optimal approach.
Rule 702 as originally proposed by the Advisory Committee requires that
an expert be qualified "by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
to provide such assistance" as needed by a jury to understand the evidence. 98
Such a requirement is too restrictive; it would operate to narrow the
appropriate scope of expert testimony 99 The requirement might limit
questionable testimony from engineers acting as inductive witnesses,' but
it might also prevent skilled witnesses from offering their insight into litigated
issues.'
0
The proposed Rule 702 as amended by the Standing Committee changes the
language so that an expert must be qualified "to provide such testimony "102
To the extent that this language mirrors the Advisory Committee language, it
is similarly too restrictive. To the extent that the language is "unclear in its
effect," it goes no further than the present Rule to solve the qualification
problem. 3 In policing the bases of expert testimony, the proposed rules
97. Becker & Orenstein, supra note 7, at 861-62. When the amendments to Rule 702 were
originally proposed, the Standing Committee with the assistance of the Advisory Committee proposed
changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence. At that time, no independent committee on the Federal Rules
of Evidence existed. Id. at 860. The proposed Rule 702 is now before the new Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 147 F.R.D. 275, 282 (1993).
The Advisory Committee originally proposed revising Rule 702 as follows:
If the court finds (1) that reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information will
substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
and (2) that a witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education to provide such assistance, it may permit the witness to testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise. Except with leave of the court for good cause shown, the witness
shall not testify on direct examination in any civil action to any opinion or inference or reason
or basis therefor, that has not been seasonably disclosed as required under the proposed
amendments to Rules 26(a)(2) and 26(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Weinstein, supra note 94, at 636.
The proposal as amended by the Standing Committee reads as follows:
Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized information, in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if (1) the information is reasonably reliable and
will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue and (2) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education to provide such testimony. Except with leave of the court for good cause shown, the
witness shall not testify on direct examination in any civil action to any opinion or inference,
or reason or basis therefor, that has not been seasonably disclosed as required under the
proposed amendments to Rules 26(a)(2) and 26(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
137 F.RD. 53, 156 (1991).
98. See text of proposal, supra note 97.
99. "The words 'such assistance' means that the judge must find that the witness' expertise is
directed to providing the substantial assistance in the expert's particular field of expertise. The testimony
of a general medical practitioner would arguably not suffice if a medical specialist usually dealt with
the matter in question." Weinstein, supra note 94, at 637.
100. See the discussion of problems associated with engineers acting as inductive witnesses without
sufficient experience to form empirical theories, supra notes 75-87.
101. See the example, supra note 52, of the neurologist and expert testimony on the protective
qualities of helmets. The proposed language would restrict the doctor's testimony to neurology. Yet, the
example demonstrated the qualitative insight that neurologists might provide on the protective qualities
of helmets.
102. 137 F.R.D. 53, 156 (1991).
103. See Weinstein, supra note 94, at 639.
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require that scientific evidence be "reasonably reliable" and "substantially
assist the trier of fact.' ' 04 While the rules do not incorporate the Frye
standard, °5 they do attempt to weed out marginally helpful and scientifical-
ly questionable expert testimony 106 The amendments, however, do not alter
the drafting of the bases of qualification; they again list "knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education" without an effective limiting clause.'0 7
Moreover, revisions to Rule 702 are not likely the best solution to the
qualification problem. The proposed revisions place an increased burden on
the judiciary to decide the appropriate qualifications of experts. 0 8 Judges
are not in the best position to learn the subtleties associated with the
qualification of technological experts. A better solution is one that focuses
attention on the qualification problem and allows the adversarial system to act
accordingly With an understanding of the qualification problem, party-
opponents can effectively challenge inappropriate qualifications through voir
dire. "[T]he Advisory Committee [should] make changes in Notes accompany-
ing Rules or provide continuing commentaries rather than following the
present trend of increased complexity and detail in the rules whenever the
bench or bar is seen as threatening to go astray in a procedural area."' 9 The
Advisory Note to Rule 702 should generate the needed awareness of the
problem.
The Advisory Note could include the following language:
While Rule 702 provides several bases for qualification of experts, one
basis will not necessarily provide the expertise another basis might provide.
The manner of qualification should logically justify the scope of the
expert's testimony Technological experts are particularly prone to
inappropriate qualification when the methods of qualification are not
properly distinguished.
Many of the examples provided by this Note could be included with the
comments to the Advisory Note to illustrate the problem. The caveat would
provide a warning to the bench and bar of the qualification problem and
caution that a fit must exist between an expert's qualifications and testimony
As demonstrated in this Note, the problem can be acute when technological
experts are used.
104. See supra note 97.
105. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see Daulbert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (holding that the Frye test was superseded by the enactment of FED. R. OF
EVID. 702).
106. See 137 F.R.D. at 156, advisory committee notes.
107. Id.
108. "The Rule 702 proposed amendments would make use of experts more difficult. They would
shift to the judge substantial power to exclude or limit expert testimony." Weinstein, supra note 94, at
634.
109. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, there is a role in the courtroom for both the engineering expert and
the technically-skilled expert. Problems arise, however, when judges and
practitioners do not recognize a distinction between the witness types. Failure
to make the inductive-deductive distinction injects unreliable and irrelevant
evidence into the trial. The inductive-deductive distinction is easily applied
and can alleviate any confusion regarding the appropriate roles of the various
technological experts. When the roles of the witness types are clear, a judge
can suitably qualify technological experts and constrain the expert's testimony
to areas actually within the expert's knowledge. Further, the inductive-
deductive dichotomy highlights and, in some cases, mitigates the problems
inherent in expert testimony.

